There is a particular form of wishful thinking that affects democracies when they want commerce and stability badly enough: the belief that a technical agreement in a limited domain signals a transformation of a relationship's fundamental character. India appears susceptible to this temptation in its approach to normalising relations with China.

The patrolling agreement reached after four years of military standoffs is real progress. No one should minimise the value of tension reduction between nuclear-armed neighbours. But an agreement on patrol modalities at Depsang and Demchok does not resolve the fact that China claims approximately 38,000 square kilometres of territory under Indian administration — a claim it has not retracted and has supported with continuous infrastructure development.

What worries me is the diplomatic narrative that is forming around the agreement: language about "turning a new page," "entering a new era of cooperation," and — most dangerously — suggestions that the border issue has been "largely resolved." It has not been resolved. It has been managed, which is meaningfully better than conflict but categorically different from resolution.

India must not allow the economic pressure to normalise trade with China — pressure that is real, given Chinese supply chains embedded in Indian manufacturing — to override the strategic patience that the border situation demands. Normalisations achieved too quickly, without substantive territorial clarity, historically produce disappointments that are more damaging than sustained caution.