India's constitutional design is explicitly federal, even if the word "federal" does not appear in the document. The enumerated legislative lists, the Finance Commission process, the autonomy of elected state governments in their assigned domains — all of these represent the framers' deliberate choice to distribute power between the union and states rather than concentrate it at the centre.

Over the past decade, this balance has shifted. Not dramatically or through any single unconstitutional act, but through a series of institutional and policy decisions that have cumulatively reduced the effective autonomy of state governments.

The GST Council's decision-making process has, in practice, been dominated by the union government despite the formal equal-voice structure. Finance Commission transfers have shifted emphasis from untied grants that states can deploy according to their priorities towards conditional funds that require states to implement centrally designed programmes. Governor appointments have increasingly placed politically aligned figures who then exercise constitutional discretion in ways that serve the appointing government's interests.

Southern and eastern states — which tend to govern differently from the national ruling coalition — feel this centralisation most acutely. Tamil Nadu, Kerala, and West Bengal have each been embroiled in conflicts with centrally appointed governors over bills, appointments, and policy implementation that reflect this fundamental tension.